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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Thomas David Moffat appeals from his conviction for attempted 
strangulation and the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss that 
charge on the claim that his constitutional rights against being placed in double 
jeopardy under both the federal and state constitutions were violated. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
On July 23, 2010, Moffat was charged in a Bannock County Criminal 
Complaint with one count of attempted strangulation, which alleged he choked or 
attempted to strangle Jennifer Nelson, a household member, on May 9, 2010. 
(R., pp.1-2.) After a preliminary hearing on October 25,2010, Moffat was bound 
over to district court on that same charge. (R., pp.34-37.) Moffat, through 
counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Double Jeopardy" (R., pp.51-
55), alleging he was placed in double jeopardy because he had been charged 
(see R., p.71), convicted (by guilty plea), and sentenced, for misdemeanor 
domestic violence in a separate proceeding based on the same incident as the 
attempted strangulation charge. After a hearing on Moffat's motion (see 
generally 3/10/11 Tr.), the district court entered a memorandum decision denying 
Moffat's motion (R., pp.89-99). 
On May 2, 2011, Moffat pled guilty to the attempted strangulation charge 
pursuant to a Rule 11 binding agreement which, inter alia, allowed him to appeal 
the district court's decision denying his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy 
grounds. (R., pp.100-120.) The district court sentenced Moffat to a unified term 
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of eleven years with the first five years fixed, suspended that sentence, and 
placed him on probation for five years. (R., pp.121-129.) Moffat filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (R., pp.130-133.) 
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ISSUE 
Moffat states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court improperly denied Mr. Moffat's motion to 
dismiss because the second prosecution violated his state and 
federal constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Moffat failed to establish that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss based on its determination that Moffat was not placed in double jeopardy 
under either the federal or state constitutions? 
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ARGUMENT 
Moffat Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred By Denying His 
Motion To Dismiss Based On Double Jeopardy Grounds 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that Moffat's attempted strangulation charge 
did not result in a violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the federal or state 
constitutions under the "statutory" theory (i.e., Blockburger1Jest), the "pleading" 
theory, or the "elements" theory. (R., pp.89-99.) Moffat contends on appeal that 
the district court erred in its Blockburger analysis of his federal and state double 
jeopardy claims because, he asserts, it is impossible to commit the crime of 
attempted strangulation without also committing the crime of misdemeanor 
domestic violence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.) Moffat also argues that the 
district court erred in denying his state double jeopardy claim under the pleading 
theory because "the attempted strangulation was merely the means or manner 
by which the domestic battery was committed." (Appellant's Brief, p.16 
(capitalization modified).) 
Contrary to Moffat's arguments, he has failed to demonstrate that his 
attempted strangulation charge was based on the same act(s) as his domestic 
violence charge; therefore, double jeopardy protections do not apply to his case. 
Although the district court denied Moffat's double jeopardy claim on different 
grounds, this Court should nevertheless affirm the district court's order based 
upon the correct theory. 
1 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review." 
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000). Where 
the lower court reaches the correct result by a different theory, the appellate 
court will affirm the order on the correct theory. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 
P.2d 1218,1222 (1997). 
C. Factual Background 
Pocatello Police Officer Paul Tolman arrested Moffat on May 9, 2010 and 
issued him a citation for domestic battery. (R., p.71.) The citation merely alleged 
a violation for "Domestic Battery 18-918(b)(3),,,2 and made no mention of Moffat 
choking or attempting to strangle Ms. Nelson. (ld.) At the hearing on Moffat's 
motion to dismiss his attempted strangulation charge based on double jeopardy, 
Officer Tolman explained that when he issued the citation to Moffat for domestic 
battery, he did not "see any felony." (3/10/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.19-22.) 
Officer Tolman also presented an affidavit to the Sixth District Court for 
determining whether Moffat's arrest was supported by probable cause. (R., pp.9-
10)3 According to the officer's affidavit, he arrested Moffat for domestic battery 
2 The correct statutory citation for misdemeanor domestic battery is I.C. § 18-
918(3)(b). 
3 The numbering of the Clerk's Record is out of order from pages 7 through 10, 
as borne out by the police report page numbers at the top right of each page. 
The Detail Incident Report for the May 9, 2010 incident should comprise, 
sequentially, pages 5 through 8 of the Clerk's Record, and the Affidavit of 
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based on facts contained in a police report describing his investigation of a May 
9,2010 incident, which, in relevant part, provided the following: 
Nelson told me that at approximately 0500 hours this morning, she 
and Moffat were engaged in an argument which became physical. . 
Nelson advised that during this time she may have pushed 
Moffat but was unsure. Nelson advised that this continued for 
some time until Moffat began to get angry. While they were in their 
bedroom at 552 Fairmont, Moffat grabbed her by her hair and 
grabbed her around the throat with his other hand. Moffat threw 
her around the room and pushed her into objects. Nelson stated 
that they were fighting directly in front of the large picture window 
which is in their bedroom. ... At one point, Moffat grabbed her 
and pushed her onto the ground. Nelson stated that her back was 
scraped near her left shoulder blade. I examined the injuries that 
Nelson had indicated. I noted that she did have distinct red marks 
on her neck which still appeared to be fresh and had fresh scraped 
skin on it. I also noted that Nelson had red marks and fresh 
scrapes on both of her knees. She indicated that she had been 
forced onto the ground by Moffat. 
(R., p.? (sequential) (capitalization of names modified).) Although Ms. Nelson 
told the officer that Moffat had, among other things, grabbed her around her 
throat, and the officer observed red marks on her neck,4 she made no mention 
that Moffat choked or attempted to strangle her, or that her breathing had 
otherwise been interrupted by him. 
Marie and Sam Stones were riding bicycles with their children outside 
Moffat's residence at the time of the incident, and Marie saw through an open 
picture window that "a male subject was holding the female subject by her hair 
and in the area of her throat with his other hand," and "then saw the male subject 
Probable Cause Arrest Report should be pages 9 and 10 of the Clerk's Record. 
The state will refer to the Clerk's Record of those documents according to their 
correct sequence. 
4 During the hearing on Moffat's motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy, 
Officer Tolman testified that he also observed "finger-type marks" on Ms. 
Nelson's neck. (3/10/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.20-23) 
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push the female subject toward the wall." (R., p.? (sequential).) However, Marie 
Stones did not state that the male subject either appeared to be choking or 
attempting to strangle the female subject.5 
Law enforcement was first informed by Ms. Nelson on May 12, 2010, that 
Moffat had not only grabbed her, but also choked or attempted to strangle her 
during the May 9th incident. (R., p.14.) A supplemental narrative report by 
Officer Wadsworth explained: 
On 05-12-10 at approximately 0920 hours I made contact with 
Jennifer Nelson by telephone. She agreed to come in today for 
follow up photos and an interview. Jennifer Nelson was able to 
respond at approximately 1130 hours on this date. 
In talking with Nelson she was concerned that no charges had been 
filed on Moffat for Attempted Strangulation. In reviewing the report 
and the statement given by Nelson to Officer Tolman, there were 
no details on when she was choked. In the original statement 
given, Nelson indicated to Tolman that she had been grabbed by 
the neck and thrown to the ground. Nelson stated in the interview 
today that she had been choked by Moffat and that she did not 
remember blacking out or passing out. However, she did 
remember that she could not breathe during this episode. She did 
not know how long she'd been choked, but remembers after being 
choked she was tossed to the ground. She indicated that while 
Moffat was choking her, he was pulling her hair with the other hand. 
She stated that she was in a lot of pain during this incident. 
After re-interviewing Nelson regarding this incident, this report will 
be forwarded to the Bannock County Prosecutor's Office to 
determine if charges for Felony Attempted Strangulation need to be 
pursued .... 
(R., pp.13-14 (capitalization of names modified).) 
Based on Officer Wadsworth's report, the first time law enforcement 
authorities were apprised by Ms. Nelson that Moffat had choked or attempted to 
5 Sam Stones told the officer that he did not see the male actually touch the 
female, but he could hear them yelling, and after the female started screaming 
loudly, he saw the male close the blinds on the window. (R., p.? (sequential).) 
? 
strangle her was three days after Moffat was arrested and charged with 
misdemeanor domestic battery. (ld.) As a result of that new information, Moffat 
was charged in a separate case with attempted strangulation, a felony. (R., pp.1-
2, 36-37.) 
D. Moffat Has Failed To Show That Either One Of His Guilty Pleas Were 
Based On His "Grabbing" Ms. Nelson's Throat; Therefore, He Has Failed 
To Demonstrate Any Double Jeopardy Violation 
In Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (1932), the United States Supreme Court 
set forth the applicable test for double jeopardy as follows: 
[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two 
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine 
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each 
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. 
(Emphasis added.) By its very terms, application of the Blockburger test for 
double jeopardy is conditioned on there being multiple offenses which stem from 
the "same act or transaction." lsL If, however, multiple charges are based on 
different acts, double jeopardy protections cannot be violated and neither the 
Blockburger test, nor the pleading theory have any application. As explained by 
the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Siewkiewicz, 802 N.E.2d 767, 771 (III. 
2003): 
Prior to applying the Blockburger test, we must decide 
whether defendant's reckless homicide prosecution is based on a 
different act than his reckless driving conviction. Under 
Blo ckb urger, if the prosecutions are predicated on different criminal 
acts, then the prohibition against double jeopardy is not violated. 
See Blo ckb urger, 284 U.S. at 304,52 S.Ct. at 182, 76 L.Ed. at 309. 
If, however, there was only a single physical act, we must apply the 
Blockburger test to determine whether one charge is a less-
included offense of the other. 
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See Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ("Because the 
offenses at issue involve separate acts, we need not determine whether those 
offenses would be considered the 'same' under the Blockburger test because the 
precondition for employing the test (that the two offenses involve the same 
conduct) is absent."); United States v. Kee, 2000 WL 86317 *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
("Neither the principle of multiplicity nor the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a 
defendant's being charged with more than one violation of the same statute 
where different acts underlie each violation."); Peckinpaugh v. State, 743 N.E.2d 
1238, 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ("where, as here, a double jeopardy challenge is 
premised upon convictions of multiple counts of the same offense, the statutory 
elements test is inapplicable, because a defendant may be charged with as many 
counts of an offense as there are separate acts committed"). 
On appeal, Moffat argues that, under the Blockburger test, every 
attempted strangulation constitutes the lesser offense of battery, and therefore, 
his misdemeanor domestic battery conviction precludes him from being 
subsequently prosecuted for the greater offense of attempted strangulation. 
(See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.9-16.) Although the same act of choking6 or 
attempting to strangle a person may encompass a battery, Moffat overlooks the 
fact that neither the Blockburger test nor double jeopardy protections are 
applicable when two or more offenses are based on separate acts. Here, Moffat 
has failed to show his conviction for domestic battery and his attempted 
strangUlation charge were both based on the same act. 
6 Merriam-Webster's online dictionary gives the relevant definition of "choke" as 
"to check or block normal breathing of by compressing or obstructing the trachea 
.... " Internet site: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/choke. 
9 
1. Moffat Has Failed To Show That He Pled Guilty To Domestic 
Battery Based On His Grabbing Of Ms. Nelson's Throat As 
Described In Officer Tolman's Initial Report Of The May 9th Incident 
Moffat has not shown that his conviction for misdemeanor domestic 
battery was not based on acts other than his grabbing Ms. Nelson's throat as 
Officer Tolman initially reported in regard to the May 9, 2010 incident. As the 
record reflects, Moffat was arrested after he grabbed Ms. Nelson by her hair, 
grabbed her around her throat, threw her around the room and into objects, and 
pushed her onto the ground. (R., p.7 (sequential).) The citation issued to Moffat 
upon his arrest, charging him with misdemeanor domestic battery under I.C. § 
18-918(3)(b), did not specify which act constituted the offense. Although the 
police report submitted by Officer Tolman in support of his probable cause 
affidavit described all of the afore-mentioned acts, it did not state which act 
Moffat was arrested for or charged with committing. (See R., pp.5-10.) 
Additionally, Moffat provided no evidence to the district court establishing 
his domestic battery conviction and the attempted strangulation charge arose 
from the same criminal act. For example, he provided no transcript or other 
record of his plea entry hearing. Without a record of that hearing, Moffat cannot 
show that when he pled guilty to domestic battery, he did so based on his having 
grabbed Ms. Nelson by her throat. Conversely, Moffat cannot demonstrate that 
his plea was not based only on one or more of the other acts described in Officer 
Tolman's police report that would support a domestic battery conviction. 
Moffat has failed to demonstrate that his guilty plea to misdemeanor 
domestic battery was based on his grabbing of Ms. Nelson's throat as reported 
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by Officer Tolman's initial report regarding the May 9, 2010 incident. 
Accordingly, even assuming Moffat's attempted strangulation charge was based 
on the act described in the officer's initial report, double jeopardy principles are 
not implicated because the domestic battery charge has not been shown by 
Moffat to have been based on the same act. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 
2. Moffat Has Failed To Show That His Attempted Strangulation 
Charge Was Based On The Same "Grabbing" Act Described In The 
May 9th Police Reports 
Moreover, Moffat has failed to show that his attempted strangulation 
charge, to which he pled guilty, was predicated on the same act of his grabbing 
Ms. Nelson by the throat as described in Officer Tolman's initial report on the 
May 9, 2010 incident, and which was apparently observed through the picture 
window of the bedroom by Marie Stones as she and her husband rode bicycles 
past Moffat's house. (R., p.7 (sequential).) 
At the preliminary hearing, Ms. Nelson testified that, during the May 9th 
incident, Moffat was repeatedly throwing her around the room. (Prelim. Tr., p.21, 
L.10.) The following brief colloquy took place between the prosecutor and Ms. 
Nelson: 
Q: You specifically remember one time where he was choking you. 
Is it possible that there may have been another time during the 
throwing around? 
A: It's possible. 




(Prelim. Tr., p.21, Ls.11-17.) 
In re-cross examination, Ms. Nelson and Moffat's trial counsel engaged in 
the following exchange in which Ms. Nelson appears to reiterate that Moffat may 
have choked her several times, although her answers were not responsive to the 
actual questions asked: 
Q: Did he choke you or not? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You're sure. 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay. With one hand or two hands? 
A: Maybe several times. I don't know. He was throwing me 
around the room. He was grabbing my hair. He was beating me 
up. 
Q: ... So, I'm trying to just determine from you whether he choked 
you or not. You said he did and now I'm trying to ask you if it was 
with one hand or two hands? 
A: It may have been several times, you know. I don't really 
remember. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.22, L.S - p.23, L.4.) 
Inasmuch as Ms. Nelson testified that, although she didn't really recall, 
Moffat may have choked her several times during the May 9, 2010 incident, 
Moffat has failed to show that the choking act he pled guilty to in his attempted 
strangulation case was the same "grabbing the throat" act described by Officer 
Tolman's initial report of the May 9th incident. Because Moffat has failed to show 
that his guilty plea to attempted strangulation was based on the "same act" of 
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(presumed) choking as his misdemeanor domestic violence charge, under 
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, double jeopardy does not apply to his situation. 
3. Conclusion 
Moffat has failed to show that his act of grabbing Ms. Nelson's throat, as 
described by Officer Tolman's initial report of the May 9th incident, was the same 
act upon which either his guilty plea to misdemeanor domestic battery or 
attempted strangulation - much less both -- were based. Therefore, under 
Blockburger or any other double jeopardy theory, constitutional double jeopardy 
protections do not preclude Moffat's conviction or punishment for attempted 
strangulation. Although not the basis for the district court's denial of Moffat's 
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, this Court should nevertheless 
affirm on the correct theory. Where the lower court reaches the correct result by 
a different theory, the appellate court will affirm the order on the correct theory. 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v. 
Avelar, 129 Idaho 700,704,931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Moffat's conviction and 
sentence for attempted strangulation. 
DATED this16th day of August, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of August, 2012, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
Jo, C. McKinney 
De uty Attorney General 
JCM/pm 
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